Three-Term Rule

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:

1.   When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.).   If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).

 2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service.  For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3^rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

 4. Preventive suspension is not  a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).

 5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from  serving  what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida  and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

 6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish.  His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.  Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered  by his opponent (Torres).  Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term (Mayor Abelardo Abundo, Sr., Vs. Commission on Elections & Ernesto R. Vega, G.R. No. 201716. January 8, 2013).

Second Motion for Reconsideration

It was error, too, for the Trial Court to deny Atty. Dizon's motion dated November 21, 1989 for reconsideration of the Orders of April 24, October 17, and October 25, 1989, on the ground that it was in effect a second motion for reconsideration "the rules does (sic) not allow a second motion for reconsideration without first securing leave of court . . ." There is no such rule as regards interlocutory orders like those sought to be reconsidered. The Trial Judge might possibly have had in mind Section 4, Rule 37, of the Rules of Court, governing a "second motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made," but the section clearly applies only to final judgments, not to interlocutory orders. The Trial Judge might have had in mind Section 1, Rule 52 pertinently providing that "(n)o more than one motion for re-hearing or reconsideration shall be filed without express leave of court," but again, it is clear that the proviso applies only to final judgments of the Court of Appeals, not to interlocutory orders or resolutions. The Trial Judge might have had in view Section 11 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) which inter alia decrees that "no second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained," or paragraph 4 of the Interim or Transitional Rules relative to the implementation of said B.P. Blg. 129, promulgated by this Court, declaring that "(n)o party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment;" but again these provisions obviously have reference not to interlocutory orders but to final judgments or orders. A second motion attacking an interlocutory order might possibly be denied on the ground that it is a "rehash" or mere reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the Court; it cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law (Dizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96296 June 18, 1992).

Nature of Votes Cast for Nuisance Candidate

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes.  It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. 

We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law (Casimira S. Dela Cruz Vs. Commission on Elections and John Lloyd M. Pacete, G.R. No. 192221. November 13, 2012).

Owner of River Beds

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person (Republic of the Philippines Vs. Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III, et al., G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012).

Vested Right

It is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case (Brigido B. Quia Vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012).

Net Profits of Property Regime

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY

(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute community.  And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the “market value at dissolution.”

(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community.  Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the “market value at dissolution.”

(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset.  And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the “net profits.”

(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.”  However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children.  Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS 

In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:

(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties.   In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties when they married.

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;  and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.

(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties.  But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.

(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.   In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,  there is nothing to return to any of them.  The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership.  Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.  Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor (Brigido B. Quia Vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012).

Nominal Damages - Dismissal Without Due Process

Applying the rule to the facts at hand, we grant a monetary award of P50,000.00 as nominal damages, this, pursuant to the fresh ruling of this Court in Culili v. Eastern Communication Philippines, Inc. Due to the failure of Lynvil to follow the procedural requirement of two-notice rule, nominal damages are due to respondents despite their dismissal for just cause (Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and/or Rosendo S. De Borja Vs. Andres G. Ariola, et al., G.R. No. 181974. February 1, 2012).