Vested Right

It is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case (Brigido B. Quia Vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012).

Net Profits of Property Regime

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY

(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute community.  And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the “market value at dissolution.”

(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community.  Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the “market value at dissolution.”

(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset.  And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the “net profits.”

(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.”  However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children.  Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS 

In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:

(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties.   In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties when they married.

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;  and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.

(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties.  But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.

(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.   In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,  there is nothing to return to any of them.  The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership.  Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.  Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor (Brigido B. Quia Vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012).

Nominal Damages - Dismissal Without Due Process

Applying the rule to the facts at hand, we grant a monetary award of P50,000.00 as nominal damages, this, pursuant to the fresh ruling of this Court in Culili v. Eastern Communication Philippines, Inc. Due to the failure of Lynvil to follow the procedural requirement of two-notice rule, nominal damages are due to respondents despite their dismissal for just cause (Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and/or Rosendo S. De Borja Vs. Andres G. Ariola, et al., G.R. No. 181974. February 1, 2012).

Howey Test - Investment Contract

          The United States Supreme Court held in Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.  that, for an investment contract to exist, the following elements, referred to as the Howey test must concur: (1) a contract, transaction, or scheme; (2) an investment of money; (3) investment is made in a common enterprise; (4) expectation of profits; and (5) profits arising primarily from the efforts of others.   Thus, to sustain the SEC position in this case, PCI’s scheme or contract with its buyers must have all these elements.

          The CA is right in ruling that the last requisite in the Howey test is lacking in the marketing scheme that PCI has adopted.  Evidently, it is PCI that expects profit from the network marketing of its products.  PCI is correct in saying that the US$234 it gets from its clients is merely a consideration for the sale of the websites that it provides. 

Venue of Perjury

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed (UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012).

Ownership of Thing Stolen Immaterial

Moreover, we agree with the CA when it gave short shrift to petitioner’s argument that full ownership of the thing stolen needed to be established first before she could be convicted of qualified theft. As correctly held by the CA, the subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property (Anita L. Miranda Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176298. January 25, 2012).

Liability for Non-Deployment

Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of salary as provided in the contract. This is but proper because of the non-deployment of respondent without just cause (Stolt-Nielsen Transporation Group, Inc., et al. Vs. Sulpecio Modequillo, G.R. No. 177498. January 18, 2012).

Surety

The main issue to be resolved is one of first impression: whether a surety is liable to the creditor in the absence of a written contract with the principal.

A surety contract is merely a collateral one, its basis is the principal contract or undertaking which it secures. Necessarily, the stipulations in such principal agreement must at least be communicated or made known to the surety particularly in this case where the bond expressly guarantees the payment of respondent’s fuel products withdrawn by Fumitechniks in accordance with the terms and conditions of their agreement. The bond specifically makes reference to a written agreement. It is basic that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. Moreover, being an onerous undertaking, a surety agreement is strictly construed against the creditor, and every doubt is resolved in favor of the solidary debtor. Having accepted the bond, respondent as creditor must be held bound by the recital in the surety bond that the terms and conditions of its distributorship contract be reduced in writing or at the very least communicated in writing to the surety. Such non-compliance by the creditor (respondent) impacts not on the validity or legality of the surety contract but on the creditor’s right to demand performance (First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance Corporation (now known as FLT Prime Insurance Corporation) Vs. Chevron Philippines, inc. (formerly known as Caltex Philippines, Inc.), G.R. No. 177839. January 18, 2011)