Three-Term Rule

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:

1.   When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.).   If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).

 2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service.  For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3^rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

 4. Preventive suspension is not  a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).

 5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from  serving  what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida  and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

 6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish.  His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.  Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered  by his opponent (Torres).  Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term (Mayor Abelardo Abundo, Sr., Vs. Commission on Elections & Ernesto R. Vega, G.R. No. 201716. January 8, 2013).

Second Motion for Reconsideration

It was error, too, for the Trial Court to deny Atty. Dizon's motion dated November 21, 1989 for reconsideration of the Orders of April 24, October 17, and October 25, 1989, on the ground that it was in effect a second motion for reconsideration "the rules does (sic) not allow a second motion for reconsideration without first securing leave of court . . ." There is no such rule as regards interlocutory orders like those sought to be reconsidered. The Trial Judge might possibly have had in mind Section 4, Rule 37, of the Rules of Court, governing a "second motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made," but the section clearly applies only to final judgments, not to interlocutory orders. The Trial Judge might have had in mind Section 1, Rule 52 pertinently providing that "(n)o more than one motion for re-hearing or reconsideration shall be filed without express leave of court," but again, it is clear that the proviso applies only to final judgments of the Court of Appeals, not to interlocutory orders or resolutions. The Trial Judge might have had in view Section 11 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) which inter alia decrees that "no second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained," or paragraph 4 of the Interim or Transitional Rules relative to the implementation of said B.P. Blg. 129, promulgated by this Court, declaring that "(n)o party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment;" but again these provisions obviously have reference not to interlocutory orders but to final judgments or orders. A second motion attacking an interlocutory order might possibly be denied on the ground that it is a "rehash" or mere reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the Court; it cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law (Dizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96296 June 18, 1992).

Nature of Votes Cast for Nuisance Candidate

COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes.  It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. 

We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law (Casimira S. Dela Cruz Vs. Commission on Elections and John Lloyd M. Pacete, G.R. No. 192221. November 13, 2012).

Owner of River Beds

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person (Republic of the Philippines Vs. Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III, et al., G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012).